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# CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

## "SUMMIT" SUPPLEMENT



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OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

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SUMMIT CONFERENCE SUPPLEMENT TO THE  
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

30 June 1955

The following is a summary of information received during the week on Soviet bloc preparations for the four-power conference.

General Soviet objectives and attitudes

Tone of Soviet press becomes milder: The general tenor of a TASS despatch published in leading Soviet papers on 29 June on Secretary Dulles' 28 June press conference is considerably milder than the almost virulent attacks on him which characterized the Soviet treatment of the four-power talks until about one week before. Since that time the subject of four-power talks *per se* has not figured in the Soviet press. The American embassy in Moscow notes that the milder tone, which may be connected with the anniversary session of the UN and handling of the recent Neptune incident, is also reflected in a 29 June Pravda article. The article was particularly notable for the emphasis it placed on the necessity for friendly relations "in first instance" between the great powers and on their co-operation to avoid war, cease the arms race, and strengthen peace. [redacted]

Soviet propaganda: During the period 20-26 June, Moscow broadcasts covered the Helsinki Peace Assembly in considerable volume. Almost every principal speaker at that assembly linked it with the summit meeting and extolled the efficacy of negotiations.

Yugoslav views: Yugoslav acting foreign secretary Prica told the American, British and French ambassadors on 24 June that he believes the "Soviets are ready to solve questions on the basis of status quo" by trying to keep what they have and find a *modus vivendi*. The recent Belgrade talks convinced the Yugoslavs that the Soviets genuinely desire a period of peace at this time. [redacted]

The Yugoslav government believes that the change in Soviet policy has been forced by internal difficulties and hence is more real than if prompted by a subjective change of heart. But the Yugoslavs believe that Soviet weaknesses are relative and not absolute, and could be overcome if necessary for "a historical period (decades and decades)." If the USSR thought that Western policy did not give it the possibility to go forward with new methods, this could cause it to revert to the path it had followed before. The Yugoslavs regard internal changes as in process but as having come now into a "phase" to force changes in Soviet internal and external policy. It will be a long time, however, before the finished result appears. On the other hand, the Yugoslavs believe we should not overestimate changes in Soviet policy or relax defense efforts.

The Yugoslav government received a strong impression from recent talks with Soviet leaders that the USSR genuinely desires peace "not for one or two years but for a historical period." If Soviet actions do not all seem to point in this direction, the Yugoslavs ascribe this to the difficulty of getting rid of Stalinist "baggage" after 30 years of living under the system, the influence of which is "very peculiar on the minds of human beings." [redacted]

Swedish view: The secretary general of the Swedish Foreign Ministry did not think that the Russians would stress neutralization of Germany at forthcoming negotiations. He felt the two principal Russian objectives would be (1) disarmament and (2) a European collective security system. He also felt that the Soviets really wanted a detente and that regardless of the reasons for this it was a policy which--once entered upon and encouraged by concessions on both sides--would be very difficult to reverse. [redacted]

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Soviets want peace at any price: The American embassy in Moscow reported that the generous display of food and drink at the Indian prime minister's reception did not include anything alcoholic. To the amusement of a number of the Soviet presidium, toasts were drunk in tomato juice or cider, and Mikoyan is reported to have observed, "We'll drink anything for peace." [REDACTED]

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#### Disarmament

Soviet propaganda: During the period 20-26 June, Moscow used much of the disarmament propaganda coming out of the Helsinki peace meeting. Calls for general disarmament were linked with demands for nuclear-weapons control. Joliot-Curie warned at the meeting that a ban on atomic weapons would not of itself prevent wars waged with "ordinary" weapons. A Pravda article reported that "alarm over the threat of atomic war" permeated all the speeches. Joliot-Curie's speech, reported by TASS and in the Home Service, included an unusual reference to the "great destructive forces" of nuclear weapons, "the effect of which spreads over great distances and is preserved for a long time." Publicity for the Helsinki conference did not approach the huge propaganda effort built around the 1952 World Peace Council meeting in Stockholm but far surpassed the attention given the last mammoth WPC conference in Vienna in the summer of 1954.

Dangers of atomic war: In commenting on the Bulganin-Nehru statement, the American embassy views the passage which states that "more general appreciation is now discernible everywhere of the dangers of war in the atomic age" as a possible Soviet shift back toward the so-called Malenkov appraisal of the dangers of atomic war. [REDACTED]

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Soviet proposal: The Soviet ambassador in Paris told the American ambassador at a dinner and in the presence of numerous French guests that it might be difficult to reach any agreement on disarmament controls. He admitted that any inspection thorough enough to give assurance might involve unacceptable invasion of national privacy rights. He suggested as an alternative that no one would make use of atomic or thermonuclear weapons which they might possess. He said that such an agreement would be satisfactory to the Soviets and with such an agreement they would be willing to move ahead on conventional disarmament along the lines of their recent proposal. [REDACTED]

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Peaceful uses of atomic energy: The American embassy in Moscow reports that the Moscow press announced on 15 June that agreements had been concluded with Hungary and Bulgaria for Soviet assistance in the development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. The aid is to include delivery by the Soviet Union of "experimental atomic reactors and accelerators" as well as technical assistance, scientific documentation, and preparation and training of Hungarian and Bulgarian scientists and technicians. The embassy comments that the announcement is almost identical to announcements of similar aid to Communist China, Poland,

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Czechoslovakia, Rumania and East Germany. This one differs in two respects: (1) it makes no reference to the time when aid will be rendered; previous announcements said "in the course of 1955-56," and (2) it does not say that radioactive isotopes will be provided until the recipients are able to make their own. [REDACTED]

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Soviet invitations to atomic energy conference: According to a Beirut broadcast, the Syrian government has received an invitation from Russia to attend an atomic conference in Moscow between 1 and 5 July. The Syrian government allegedly had no objection to participating in the conference. [REDACTED]

According to West German broadcasts, a Professor Heisenberg announced in Bonn on 22 June that the Max Planck Society had been invited by the USSR to take part in the congress of atom-research scientists planned for July in Moscow and had accepted "in principle." [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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#### Germany

Soviet propaganda: During the period 20-26 June, Moscow sustained its propaganda emphasis on the mutual advantages of normalized Soviet-West German relations, and paid only scant attention to the traditionally well-publicized anniversary of Hitler's attack on the USSR. Sparse comment on the latter event took pains to differentiate between the Hitlerites and the German people. An East German news service report on the Helsinki peace meeting included the statement that all peoples "are interested in Germany's reunion in the framework of a collective security system," and cited Soviet delegate Fedin's suggested alternatives for a peaceful Europe as (1) ideally, a collective security arrangement without military blocs and including a unified Germany, or (2) if military blocs must continue to exist, withdrawal of the Federal Republic from NATO "to lessen the military threat," or (3) German neutralization with a guarantee against "aggressive" German armed forces.

Soviets prepared to accept free elections: The Soviet ambassador in Paris told the American ambassador at a dinner and in the presence of numerous French guests that the USSR was now prepared to accept free all-German elections subject to strict international control, provided only that foreign troops were withdrawn from German soil prior to the vote. [REDACTED]

Tito's view of Soviet position: Tito told the American ambassador on 27 June that he thought it unlikely that the Soviets would make proposals on Germany at Geneva, although he admitted no one could be sure. He thought the Soviets would first show their hand when Adenauer went to Moscow, and he expected something more than propaganda. He believes the USSR is not yet ready to hand over the East zone. [REDACTED]

Soviets playing for time: Rudolf Augstein, "one of the most influential political commentators in Germany," expressed the view to an American official that the men in the Kremlin are playing for time before permitting German reunification. They are not too concerned over the success or failure of the forthcoming big-four conference. Rather, they are gambling that in the long run, an "Austrian solution" will become more and more attractive for the Germans. He expects the Russians to come forward with plausible proposals for Germany which would be sheer bluff. [REDACTED]

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Soviet plan for Berlin: A Swedish newspaper on 20 June carried a story from its Bonn correspondent reporting a so-called Semenov Plan for a "free" Berlin. The plan called for (1) withdrawal of Western and Soviet troops from Berlin, (2) introduction of neutral troops, presumably Swedish, to take over and establish a neutral belt around the city to prevent friction with the surrounding Soviet occupied zone, (3) "free" elections to result in a Senate and Administration for Berlin, and (4) a proclamation declaring Berlin a free city. [REDACTED]



All-European security pact

Soviet propaganda: During the period 20-26 June, a widely broadcast 21 June commentary repeated last year's line that a collective security system would have prevented the German attack on the USSR and the carnage of World War II. Collective security as a basis for German reunification was not discussed in Moscow's broadcasts [REDACTED] but an abridged TASS revision of Ehrenburg's Helsinki speech cited his comment--following a passage on the desirability of a unified Germany free from militarism--that the neutrality of any single state cannot alone "solve the question of entire Europe."

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Status of the Satellites

Yugoslav views: Yugoslav acting foreign secretary Prica claimed to the American, British and French ambassadors on 24 June that a "not very weak influence in Eastern Europe" was already evident as a result of the Yugoslav-Soviet talks. He claimed Soviet authority in Eastern Europe was no longer the Stalinian authority and that the USSR would be forced to adopt "smoother" methods of control. [REDACTED]

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Tito told the American ambassador on 27 June that he thought the Soviet-Yugoslav declaration was having an effect and, while not much was observable from the Satellite leaders, it was fermenting in the masses of Satellite peoples. He was firmly convinced that changes in Soviet-Satellite relations were coming. [REDACTED]

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Possible motives for relaxation of Soviet control: Herbert Wehner, the foreign policy expert of the West German Social Democratic Party, told an American official on 6 June that he thought the Soviets had gritted their teeth and gone ahead with the unpleasant business of recognizing the merits of Tito's position because, after a long discussion and many experiments, they had finally decided that it would be impossible to maintain the iron political orthodoxy of Stalin in the Satellites over a long period owing especially to the important and clearly different ideological development in China. To use Leninist terms, the Soviet leadership had decided to take one step backward to take two steps forward--to relax its ideological hold on the Satellite countries and permit them to develop their own brand of native Titoism. Because of the military and economic dominance of the Soviet Union over these areas, this shift would probably not cost the USSR any real loss of control and at the same time would relieve it of the unendurable strain of attempting to maintain a monolithic orthodoxy everywhere. No one could be sure at this stage of the true Soviet motives, Wehner said, but it was clear that the shift, whatever its underlying reasons, had been designed for propaganda exploitation in the current Soviet effort to make the Soviet Union appear conciliatory and peace-minded. The Soviet objective remained constant. It was to force Americans to withdraw their military bases from Europe and then Africa and the Middle East. [REDACTED]

Soviet forces in Rumania: The American legation in Bucharest reported that fast-moving international events continue to stimulate conflicting rumors and a sense of anticipation in Bucharest. [REDACTED] at least one school for Russian children had been abandoned, but others were known to be still operating. No decrease had been observed in the numbers of Soviet civilians and troops. [REDACTED]

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Rumors: An official of the Norwegian trade delegation in Budapest learned a few days after his arrival there in May that a rumor had spread through the city that the delegation was a Nansen commission which had come to supervise free elections in Hungary upon withdrawal of Russian troops. This, the rumors had it, would occur in three months or so. [REDACTED]

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Neutral belt

Sweden: The secretary general of the Swedish Foreign Ministry, in stating that he felt the USSR really wanted a detente, underlined the many indications that restrictions on individual freedoms in Russia were being perceptibly relaxed and mentioned increasing technical exchanges between Russia and Sweden (visit of electrical experts followed by high-level visit of Russian housing experts, etc.)

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Denmark: The Danish prime minister and the director general of the Foreign Ministry confirmed to a US official on 9 June that there had been no Soviet approaches to Danish missions on the question of a neutral belt. The director general said that the Soviet minister had said to him the other day that he thought the idea of a neutral belt was very interesting, to which the Danish official only replied that he did too.

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Soviet-Yugoslav relations: An editorial in Kommunist, reproduced in abridged form by TASS and in a Moscow broadcast to Yugoslavia, advocated the establishment of "mutual trust" between the Soviet and Yugoslav Communist parties for the first time since Khrushchev urged party rapprochement in his Belgrade speech on 26 May.

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Related Far East intelligence

Formosa: During the period 20-26 June, Moscow continued to avoid the issue of a Formosa settlement in its routine propaganda. No comment was built around Kuo Mo-jo's reiteration at Helsinki of the Chinese Communist desire to liberate Formosa peacefully or the Nehru-Bulganin declaration's expressed hope for satisfaction of Chinese Communist rights on Formosa "by peaceful means." TASS watered down Kuo's anti-American diatribe, reporting that he called Formosa "one of the causes"--rather than, as in NCNA's version, "the focal point"--of Asian tension. The USSR's proposal for a ten-power conference, recalled by Molotov at San Francisco and endorsed by Kuo Mo-jo, was not mentioned, and there was no repetition of Joliot-Curie's Helsinki call for a five-power conference after the summit meeting.

Chinese Communist propaganda merely mentioned the Formosan issue in comment on the Helsinki meeting and the UN anniversary, and in a

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denunciation of Secretary Dulles' San Francisco speech. The discussion by the Chinese Communists occurred in Kuo Mo-jo's Helsinki speech, which repeated verbatim Chou En-lai's 13 May remarks on negotiations between the United States and Communist China. Kuo's speech, however, included a statement that the CPR is "now waiting for definite and sincere replies from the US government." Chou had merely called attention to the "evasive and equivocal" stand of the US toward the proposal, and subsequent comment had followed this less precise formulation.

Indochina: During the period 20-26 June, Soviet radio commentators repeatedly echoed the Nehru-Bulganin declaration's reference to the precariousness of the Indochina armistice. Ho Chi Minh's visit to Communist China was reported fairly extensively in newscasts, but details of his Peiping speech were withheld and there was no comment in Moscow broadcasts.

Indochina: The American embassy in Moscow states that there may be some significance in the statement in the Bulganin-Nehru communiqué that implementation of the Indochina "agreements" has on the whole so far been satisfactory. [REDACTED]

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Related Near and Middle Eastern intelligence:

Nehru visit to the USSR: The Nehru-Bulganin declaration was more heavily publicized in Soviet propaganda than the Tito-Bulganin declaration. A large proportion of Moscow's comment during the period 20-26 June was beamed to Asian and Middle Eastern audiences.

The American embassy in Moscow reports that the Soviet leaders' arrangements and efforts to ingratiate themselves with Nehru were elaborate and spectacular. The embassy feels that the underlying Soviet purpose was best revealed by Bulganin's 22 June speech in which he said that Nehru's stay in the Soviet Union had given him an "opportunity to convince himself personally that the Soviet people are sincerely striving for the preservation and strengthening of peace." The embassy saw no surprises in the Bulganin-Nehru declaration, which was a check list of attitudes toward current questions on which the Indians and Soviets appear to have been in agreement before, but points out that this does not detract from the importance to the Soviets of having Nehru's name on the declaration. [REDACTED]

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Cultural and technical exchanges

No more iron curtain: The Soviet ambassador in Paris, in conversation with the American ambassador at a dinner and in the presence of numerous French guests, laid great stress on cultural exchanges and exchange of personal visits. He said that the Soviet Union now welcomed tourists of all sorts subject only to the capacity of Soviet hotels. He repeatedly stressed that it was now far easier for a

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foreigner to enter the Soviet Union than to enter the United States. He said that as far as visits from foreigners were concerned, there was no longer any iron curtain on the Soviet side but that the description was much more applicable to US visa requirements. [redacted]

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Cold-war operations

Cominform: The American embassy in Moscow notes that the Bulganin-Nehru statement contained no reference to the Cominform. This was of interest mainly because of earlier speculation that Nehru might have had in mind seeking the abolition of the Cominform as a token of the seriousness of Soviet subscription to nonintervention. [redacted]

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